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What We Teach When We Teach
About Race: The Problem of Law and
Pseudo-Economics
Steven A. Ramirez
The pseudo-science of race appears recently to have suffered some fatal
blows. For example, in 2003 PBS broadcast a three-part documentary, Race:
The Power of an Illusion, that debunked virtually all elements of racial mythol-
ogy. It demonstrated that race has no genetic or biological basis; that gross
morphological features which traditionally have defined races (like skin color)
are determined by insignificant and superficial genetic alleles with no link to
any characteristics that matter, such as intelligence, musical talent, or athletic
ability; and that race has been socially and legally constructed, despite the lack
of any scientific basis for dividing humanity into any set of racial baskets with
any generalized genetic meaning.' Although PBS doesn't have the audience
numbers of CNN or Fox News, the truth is out and spreading beyond aca-
demic journals and into the public's consciousness. Today it is generally
accepted science that race cannot be genetically defined and that there is
virtually zero genetic significance to skin color or other racial markers.2
Indeed, some have said that people who believe in race as anything other than
a social construct might as well believe in the Easter bunny or think that the
sun revolves around the earth.' Unfortunately, the law school curriculum
Steven A. Ramirez is a professor of law at Washburn University and director of the Washburn
Business and Transactional Law Center.
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1. Race: The Power of an Illusion (PBS television broadcasts Apr. 24, May 1, 8, 2003). There is a
companion Web site at <http://w-w.pbs.org/race/000_General/000_00-Home.htm>.
2. Recently leading professional societies in physical anthropology and anthropology have
released statements debunking the idea that there is any scientific basis to race and emphasiz-
ing its social construction. See Am. Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on "Race" (May 17,
1998), available at <http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm>; Am. Ass'n of Physical An-
thropologists, Statement on Biological Aspects of Race, 101 Am. J. Phys. Anthropology 569
(1996), available at <http://www.physanth.org/positions/race.html>. For a recent analysis
of evidence from genetics, archeology, and linguistics, showing that race is socially con-
structed, see Steve Olson, Mapping Human History: Discovering the Past Through Our
Genes (Boston, 2002). For a comprehensive analysis of the law's role in the social construc-
tion of race, see Ian Haney L6pez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York,
1996).
3. See Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 33, 40
n.35, 45 n.72 (2001) (citing such statements).
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seems to be a laggard, and one must generally scour the traditional courses to
find an intelligent and scientifically based discussion of race. This means that
the role of the law in fostering and perpetuating a socially significant racial
hierarchy is generally dealt with in a superficial and ill-founded manner. Law
and economics is certainly no exception.
On the contrary, law and economics as currently taught seems to ignore the
compelling economics of race (its'macroeconomic effects in particular) or,
alternatively, to teach a truncated microeconomic analysis of race that is
founded on what can only be termed pseudo-economics. This article seeks a
broader economic analysis of race, one that recognizes the limitations of the
neoclassical model of law and economics and makes use of recent economic
science that demonstrates that race is a macroeconomic catastrophe for
America. The first part of the article demonstrates law and economics' narrow
and obsolete teaching about race, even from an exclusively microeconomic
perspective. The second attempts to forge a more comprehensive economic
analysis of race, one with fundamentally different normative implications, and
one that seeks to express the macroeconomic catastrophe that is race in
America. The third applies these normative implications in an attempt to
show how the law can be traisformed from its historical and contemporary
role as perpetrator and preserver of a racial hierarchy to an instrument of
deracialization and true diversification. I conclude that legal education in the
context of law and economics suffers from a failure to teach about the
economics of race in a comprehensive and balanced fashion; indeed, this
article suggests that law and economics may be too narrowly focused in
general.
4
Race and Neoclassical Law and Economics
Kenneth J. Arrow, a Nobel laureate in economics, recently exposed the
weak foundations of the neoclassical view of racial discrimination.' Under the
neoclassical, market-based analysis, rational market participants responding
to market forces should essentially eliminate irrational racial discrimination.
Competitive markets would punish those market actors indulging in racism
(or having a "taste" for racial discrimination) because economically moti-
vated, perfectly informed actors would seize arbitrage opportunities and profit
advantages left behind by racist participants. Arrow recognizes that markets
rarely operate under perfectly competitive ideals. Still, virtually all analyses of
the intersection of race and economics are founded upon the neoclassical
4. I have previously argued that the traditional law and economics curriculum is too narrowly
focused and fails to account for the law's impact upon macroeconomic performance (out-
put, productivity, employment, inflation, growth, etc.) in the specific contexts of financial
regulation, the Great Depression, and globalization. Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social
Capitalism: The Iaw and Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42 Washburn L.J. 31
(2002); Steven A Ranirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 Md. L.
Rev. 515 (2003) [hereinafter New Deal at 70]; Steven A. Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's
New Fiasco: Globalization as Exhibit B in the Case for a New Law and Economics, 24 Mich.J.
Int'l L. 831 (2003) (book review),
5. What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination? 12 J. Econ. Persp. 91, 94-95
(1998).
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microeconomic approach, and all of what is taught in the typical law school
curriculum is narrowly focused upon the neoclassical model.6
For example, Richard A. Posner, in his influential Economic Analysis of Law,
posits that there is "nothing inefficient" about racial discrimination, and that
"there are economic forces in competitive markets that tend to minimize
discrimination." Posner claims that because those market participants with
less prejudice will have competitive advantages, markets will tend to be domi-
nated by the least prejudiced market participants.7 Thus, market action should
eliminate most racial prejudice and leave only "efficient" racial discrimina-
tion. Posner argues, for instance, that employers indulging the prejudices of
their workers may be efficiently discriminating; otherwise it would be benefi-
cial to stop such discrimination. Finally, Posner is deeply skeptical of govern-
ment efforts to intervene in markets to prevent discrimination, on the ground
that the costs to market participants of being forced to associate with those
they don't want to associate with are likely to exceed the benefits to those who
benefit from such transactions."
The first problem with this rather sanguine explanation is that it is highly
ahistorical. As Arrow said in 1972, the neoclassical model of racial discrimina-
tion "predicts the absence of the phenomenon it was designed to explain."9
Market discrimination in labor, credit, residential, and other markets per-
sisted for decades under free markets, and it continues to persist into the
twenty-first century even after the imposition of an antidiscrimination legal
regime. With or without market intervention free markets continue to yield
fundamentally racist outcomes."° Arrow describes the empirical record com-
piled by economists as "decisive" in showing that irrational discrimination
persists today. "Especially striking are the audit studies on differential treat-
ment in the housing and automobile markets ..."" Economics provides no
6. SeeJohnJ. Donohue I1, Discrimination in Employment, in I The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics and the Law 615-24 (London, 1998). An exception argues that markets are an
inappropriate lens for understanding racism at all; instead, racism is a response that reflects
dark human motivations toward subordination and domination. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley? 93 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 215 (1998) (book review); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role
of Consent in the Moral Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 Harv. L. tev. 384
(1985); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1757, 1763-64 (2003) (book review).
7. 6th ed., 681-82 (New York, 2003). Other texts manage to completely avoid any discussion of
the economics of race in America. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and Economics: Cases,
Materials and Behavioral Perspectives, at xi-xvii, 773-76 (St. Paul, 2002).
8. The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 513, 515-17 (1987). Other
scholars have disagreed with Posner about whether Title VII is efficient. SeeJohnJ. Donohue
III, Is Title VII Efficient? 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1411, 1431 (1986).
9. Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Mathematical Models of Race Discrimination in the Labor Market,
in Racial Discrimination in Economic Life, ed. Anthony H. Pascal, 187, 192 (Lexington,
Mass., 1972).
10. E.g., Ian A)Tes, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estinates of
Its Cause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 109 (1995). See also Ian Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice? Unconven-
tional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination (Chicago, 2001).
11. Arrow, supranote 5, at 92-93, 96 (citing William A. DarityJr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on
Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 63
(1998) ;John Yinger, Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer Markets, 12J. Econ. Persp. 23
(1998)).
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ready explanation why any rational seller would allow race to impede market
transactions like the sale of cars. Arrow concludes that the market-based
approach to discrimination squares with neither the clear historic record nor
current reality.
Next Arrow demonstrates that the market-based analysis of race discrimina-
tion cannot square with a host of observable economic facts. There is, for
example, no evidence that discriminatory firms are being driven out of the
market. Moreover, discrimination seems to persist even though corporations
are sensitive only to profits and capital markets should punish firms indulging
the discriminatory tastes of employees. Instead, discriminatory cultures may
persist for decades within corporate America with little financial detriment. In
addition, employees who are more tolerant of racial integration ought to be
paid more, but Arrow finds the evidence supporting this proposition "dubi-
ous." In short, any attempt to explain discrimination as a taste that will be
eliminated by free markets fails.12
Many economists have theorized instead that the relationship between race
and economic behavior is more complex than simple rational choice theory
suggests. For example, statistical perceptions may influence behavior as well as
reflect behavior. As Arrow says:
Suppose blacks and whites do in fact differ in productivity, at least on the
average. This is in turn due to some cause, perhaps quality of education,
perhaps cultural differences; but the cause is not itself observable. Then the
experience of employers over time will cause them to use the observable
characteristic, race, as a surrogate for the unobservable characteristics which
in fact cause the productivity differences.'"
Black workers would then react to this by forgoing investment in work skills,
which in turn would reinforce the statistical difference in productivity that
initially set off this entire behavioral dynamic. Discrimination thereby be-
comes entrenched. Simply stated, the dynamic results in black workers' facing
diminished market incentives for developing their stock of human capital.
Economist Glenn C. Loury uses the term "self-confirming stereotypes" to
explain this dynamic in The Anatomy of Racial Inequality.4 He defines a self-
confirming stereotype as
a statistical generalization about some class of persons regarding what is
taken with reason to be true about them as a class, but cannot be readily
determined as true or false for a given member of a class. Furthermore, this
generalization is "reasonable" in the specific sense that it is self-confirming:
Observers, by acting on the generalization, set in motion a sequence of events
that has the effect of reinforcing their initial judgement.' 5
Loury provides the following example. Suppose taxi drivers are unlikely to
stop for African-American males because they fear being robbed. Eventually
the African-American males seeking transportation will forgo taxis and use
12. Arrow, supra note 5, at 93-96.
13. Id. at96 (citation omitted).
14. The Anatomy of Racial Inequality 26-27 (Cambridge, Mass., 2002).
15. Id. at23.
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alternatives such as public transportation. Of course, robbers will be more
difficult to deter; and most robbers would be pleased ifjust one victim stopped
per evening. This creates a classic adverse selection problem. The pool of
African-American males seeking cabs will be disproportionately composed of
criminals, as the honest African-Americans adversely select themselves out of
the pool. This in turn confirms the original suspicions of the taxi drivers."h
Self-confirming stereotypes do not just suppress economic activity in the
labor markets or the taxi industry, but operate across society to create a wide
range of economic costs and disincentives. Loury draws examples from the
credit markets, higher education, and retail auto sales to support his self-
confirming-stereotypes thesis. It is noteworthy that his theory squares much
more with the evidence than the neoclassical theory of market discrimination.
Self-confirming stereotypes are not the only mechanism Loury identifies
that operates to suppress market action and to distort the allocation of
resources. He also identifies a dynamic he terms "racial stigma." Racial stigma,
according to Loury, refers to the consequences of the social meaning (as
opposed to individual attitudes) attached to race. In particular, Loury refers
to "unexamined beliefs" that drive public perceptions, influence public opin-
ion, and dominate public policy. 7 For instance, he cites the reception granted
The Bell Curve in 1994. Since its publication, virtually every element of its thesis
regarding race and intelligence has been thoroughly debunked. 8 Neverthe-
less, Loury argues that its thesis of race-based differences in intelligence still
holds sway in the American consciousness. Otherwise, how could our popula-
tion not find our racial nightmare "disquieting"? 9 Why is there no public
angst when African-American males are incarcerated at seven times the rate of
white males?2" What explains the very low frequency of white/African-
American marriages relative to the frequency of white/Latino or white/Asian-
American marriages?2' Loury posits that racial stigma explains how public
opinion reacts to facts and accounts for our highly racialized society. Racial
stigma provides easy comfort for those indulging the societal attitudes about
race that peirneate each person's socialization1 2
From an economic perspective, racial stigma permits a massive distortion of
the allocation of resources. First, America tolerates the systematic destruction
of human capital implicit in the excess incarceration rates that are inherent in
a racialized society. People cannot produce to their maximum extent when
they are imprisoned (obviously), or even afterwards; yet America tolerates an
incarceration rate for African-American males that can only be termed uncon-
16. Id. at 30-31.
17. Id. at 70-71.
18. E.g., Steven A. Rariirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII. 6 Mich.J. Race & L. 127,
151-54 (2000).
19. Loury, supra note 14, at 70-71.
20. Id. at 201 fig.19 .
21. Id. at 179 tbl.5.
22. Id. at 85-91.
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scionable. Second, racial stigma permits the massive disinvestment that occurs
in our education system in the children of racially stigmatized groups, relative
to the resources made available to white children.23 Instead of its highest and
best use, capital is allocated in accordance with racial stigma. Third, infant
mortality and life expectancy are influenced by race.24 All of these racial
disparities lead to depleted human capital, in an economy that is today more
than ever driven by human knowledge.
Noneconomists have also identified mechanisms of racialization that have
economic implications. Most notably, psychologists have identified and dem-
onstrated the operation of stereotype threat. Stereotype threat results in
subpar performance on high-stakes tests. African-American college students
will perform worse on an exam if they are told it is an intelligence test than
they will if they are told that the same test is a problem-solving test.25 At some
levels, stereotype threat resembles racial stigma, internalized by the indi-
vidual. From an economic point of view, it has all of the deleterious economic
effect that racial stigma has: a massive distortion of resources, insofar as
individual performance is compromised by high-stakes testing that has the
potential of stereotype threat. Obviously, self-confirming stereotypes, racial
stigma, and stereotype threat are highly disruptive to economic activity. Each
permits racial identification to have a deep and abiding impact upon a
person's life chances, and they lead naturally to a less sanguine and more
activist outlook than the laissez-faire, market-based approach to racial dis-
crimination. At the core of each concept is some cognitive flaw that pro-
foundly influences behavior in the context of a racialized society.
Race disrupts markets in other ways. Arrow concludes his exposition of the
problems plaguing the market-based approach by highlighting recent work
showing the importance of social interactions and networks in the labor
markets. He posits that hiring preferences frequently are the product of social
networks, unmediated by markets." Scholars have studied the economic value
of dense social networks. 2 Ifjobs are allocated through such networks, instead
of cold and impersonal markets, then discriminating in favor of those with
access to important and rich networks and against those with more limited
and less powerful social networks no longer has any costs to discriminating
agents-it has social payoffs. "Profit maximization is overcome by the values
inherent in the maintenance of the network or other social interaction." 28
Implicit in the importance of social networks is yet another nonmarket force
23. Mildred Robinson, Fulfilling Brown's Legacy: Bearing the Costs of Realizing Equality, 44
Washburn LJ. 1 (forthcoming 2004).
24. See Lourv, supra note 14, at 178 tbl.4; id. at 204 fig.22; id. at 182 tbl.8.
25. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Perfor-
mance ofAfrican Americans, 69J. Personality &Soc. Psychol. 797, 808 (1995).
26. Arrow, supra note 9, at 97-98.
27. E.g., Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in Women, Minori-
ties, and Employment Discrimination, eds. Phyllis A. Wallace & Annette M. LaMond (Lexing-
ton, Mass., 1977); GeorgeJ. Borjas, Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility, 107 QJ.
Econ. 123 (1992).
28. Arrow, supra note 9, at 98.
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that perpetuates racial inequality and robs markets of the ability to allocate
resources strictly in accordance with the production of the highest wealth.
Arrow suspects these social interactions are at work not only in the labor
market, but also in the credit market, the housing market, and virtually any
other market that involves a personal or social element. His suspicions seem
well founded. Racism is a fundamentally social convention. Any Southern
storekeeper who hired a black manager in the 1930s risked not only dimin-
ished custom but social ostracism and violence as well. Under such threat to
self and family, it is unlikely that the store owner would ever seek to exploit any
economic advantage that might be gained by hiring from underutilized labor
pools. Moreover, the store owner probably had a vested social interest in
maintaining the racial hierarchy and the social status that all whites, regardless
of all other educational and economic factors, are heirs to.2 ' In each transac-
tion "transactors bring . . . a whole set of social attitudes that would be
irrelevant [to a] market model," Arrow points out. "Models of racial discrimi-
nation in which all racial attitudes are expressed through the market will get at
only part of the story. At each stage, direct social transactions unmediated by a
market play a role. Even the market manifestations will be altered by these
direct social influences.
3
Unfortunately, law and economics as currently conceived teaches, at best,
only part of the story. The neoclassical market-based theory of discrimination
is too simplistic and reductionist to be helpful in resolving racial issues in
America-much less to be the exclusive pedagogical approach in law and
economics. Discriminatory behavior is far more complex and multifaceted
than neoclassical theory can support. It is not driven simply by actors seeking
to maximize profits, utility, or wealth; it is instead driven by infirmities in
human cognition, widespread imperfections in information, the desperate
need for those at the bottom rungs of society to achieve some semblance of
status, and destructive human impulses. It is driven also by social convention,
societal inertia, and racial stigma. No doubt this list is ihcomplete; many more
imponderables may cause market misanthropy. 1
What is not imponderable, however, is this: race causes suppressed and
distorted market action. It results in forgone taxi trips and ill-founded hiring
decisions. It results in forgone investments in human capital as well as in
suppressed productivity. It results in underdeveloped human capital on a
massive scale throughout society. Economists and other social scientists have
recently demonstrated some of the mechanisms underlying discriminatory
behavior. Cataloging all such mechanisms and quantifying their economic
29. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003 (1995).
30. Arrow, supra note 9, at 98.
31. In a forthcoming article I show that board directors are chosen as a result of homosocial
reproduction; cautious CEOs seek to populate boards with those most similar to them-
selves-usually white males. Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence
Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev.- (forthcoming 2004).
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impact from a microeconomic perspective may well be impossible, but a more
complete economic explanation is available from a macroeconomic point of
view, and economists are beginning to assess race and economics from that
perspective. Macroeconomics may be able to give us some degree of insight
into the magnitude of the problem, while microeconomics may help explain
the dynamics that cause it. Together they make possible a more complete
understanding of race and economics.
The Law and Macroeconomics of Race
The other part of the story is the macroeconomic catastrophe implicit in a
racialized society. As Arrow says, race is pervasive in societies where it has
taken hold. It affects housing, income, wages, the flow of capital, and the life
chances of individuals. It would be natural for Arrow, as an economist, to
focus primarily on these economic manifestations of a racialized society. But
the perverseness of race is more pervasive than economics: it is manifest in
incarceration rates, educational funding, life expectancy, medical care, stan-
dardized test scores, and even infant mortality. "Racial discrimination," says
Arrow, "pervades every aspect of a society in which it is found."32
All of this suggests severe macroeconomic harm. The impact is so huge that
it is hard to quantify. Perhaps the best starting point is the work of Andrew F.
Brirniner. In a landmark study of the economic costs of racial discrimination
against African-Americans in the labor markets, Brimmer concluded that
"[t]he disparate treatment of blacks cost the American economy about $241
billion in 1993. This figure is equal to roughly 3.8 percent of that year's gross
domestic product (GDP)." 3 Brimmer's analysis focuses on two sources of
diminished output: first, the lost economic output from the failure to exploit
the existing education of African-Americans; and second, the lost output from
a failure to improve the education of African-Americans. With respect to the
first, he notes that even today, after the promulgation of equal employment
laws, "many blacks are still concentrated in positions which do not make full
use of their talents. If... blacks could migrate more freely from low to high
productivity occupations... [,] total production would be increased."34 With
32. Arrow, supra note 9, at 91.
33. The Economic Cost of Discrimination Against Black Americans, in Economic Perspectives on
Affirmative Action, ed. Margaret C. Simms, 11, 11 (Washington, 1995). More recent evidence
has emerged that this underutilization of labor factors continues to harm American macro-
economic performance today. In the legal profession, for example, people of color are
chronically underrepresented in the ranks of corporate law firms, particularly at the partner-
ship level. See Leonard M. Baynes, Falling Through the Cracks: Race and Corporate Law
Firms, 77 St. John's L. Rev. 785, 791 (2003). Similarly, at the apex of corporate America
people of color are still largely excluded from -senior management positions and director-
ships. Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Board-
room Quell Corporate Corruption? 77 St.John's L. Rev. 837,838 (2003). The undeniilization
of labor factors is not limited to people of color; women also are far too often excluded from
full participation in the economy. Id. Nevertheless, although many of this article's fundamen-
tal points apply equally to gender issues, its primary focus is limited to the economic costs of
race in America.
34. Brimmer, supra note 33, at 13.
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respect to the second, he assesses the degree to which the underinvestment in
African-American education compromises American economic performance.
In 1990, 24 percent of all workers but only 14.7 percent of African-American
workers had four or more years of postsecondary education; in other words,
African-Americans lagged behind all other workers by nearly 40 percent.
35
This underinvestment represents undeveloped human capital and thus re-
stricted output. Brimmer's analysis concludes that as of 1993 the American
economy suffered about $140 billion in losses as a result of underutilization of
the existing African-American labor force, and an additional $100 billion in
losses from the underinvestment in African-American human capital.'
Although Brimmer's analysis is more than ten years old, there is little
reason to think the picture has brightened significantly. First, Brimmer has
used the same methodology for a number of years to analyze the economic
consequence of continued racial discrimination in the labor markets, and the
trends are discouraging. He found the economic costs of discrimination
against African-Americans in 1963 to amount to 3.5 percent of output.3 7 In
1967 the costs declined to 2.85 percent of GDP. But in 1973 and 1979 the costs
rose again to 3.13 and 3.38 respectively."8 Except for the slight dip from 1963
to 1967 (coinciding with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) the costs
of American racial disparities in employment patterns and educational attain-
ment have been remarkably durable and constant at around 3.5 percent of
GDP. If anything, the costs of these disparities seem to be on the rise, at least as
of 1993, when the costs hit a post-civil-rights-era peak of 3.79 percent. So it is
fair to assume that the lost output to the economy for the suppressed labor
productivity of African-Americans is about 3.8 to 4 percent. In today's $10
trillion economy this represents about $400 billion in forgone GDP.4"
Second, contemporary employment and educational data do not give any
cause for optimism. Basing his analysis on two elements, relative earnings for
equally educated whites and African-Americans and relative educational at-
tainment, Brimmer finds a large "income deficit" with a corresponding loss of
GDP.41 The deficit arises from differentials in mean earnings. It is clear that
today such earnings differentials are as gaping as ever. Whites with an ad-
vanced degree enjoy mean earnings of $67,940 while blacks at the same level
of education can expect to earn only $47,699 and Hispanics only $58,299.
Over the span of an entire career, blacks with advanced degrees can expect to
35. Id. at 20 tbl.2.
36. Id. at 12-13.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 19 tbl.1.
39. Id. at 12, 19 tbl.1; see also 28-29 tbl.A2. In fact, Brimmer himself projected that costs in the
year 2000 would be "essentially unchanged in percentage terms compared with what they
were in 1993." Id. at 16.
40. See Lawrence B. Morse, Teaching Macroeconomics as if Race Mattered 7, at <http://
www.ncat.edu/-econdept/wp/morse-race.pdf> (last %isitedJune 23, 2004).
41. Brimmer, supra note 33, at 11.
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earn only about 81 percent of what similarly educated whites earn; Hispanics
can expect only 84 percent.4 2 The disparity creates a disincentive to invest-
ment in education within communities of color.
The disincentive is exacerbated by considerations of wealth. In 2002 per
capita income of African-Americans was just over $15,000 per year and for
whites it was over $26,000. 4" Per capita income disparities exceed earnings
disparities because per capita income includes payoffs from rents, dividends,
and other forms of income from capital. It also reflects the burdens of chronic
unemployment, incarceration, and other forms of labor nonparticipation.
Much of this disparity in per capita income relates to durable disparities in
wealth that themselves are rooted in our racially segregated past. For present
purposes, the point is that the lessened payoffs from higher education for
communities of color, combined with diminished resources, as reflected in
per capita income, mean that there are powerful reasons for continued lack of
human capital formation. In fact, 28 percent of whites earn a bachelor's
degree; for blacks and Hispanics, respectively, the figures are only 17 percent
and 11 percent." This suggests not only that Brimmer's estimate of the costs of
race as manifest in labor markets is still generally valid today, but that it is not
likely to lessen appreciably any time soon.
Notably, Brimmer's estimate does not include other racialized groups such
as Native Americans and Latinos. There are now 39 million Latinos in the U.S.
compared to 37 million African-Americans.4 5 To the extent that Brimmer's
computation is limited to African-Americans, it states only a portion of the
problem. Based upon difference in earnings among persons holding ad-
vanced degrees, and the lower percentages holding such degrees, it is clear
that Latinos alone account for costs approaching those that Brimmer has
demonstrated for African-Americans. His analysis also is limited to economic
impact manifest in the labor market. Infant mortality, excess incarceration
rates, life expectancy, and a host of other social maladies that disproportion-
ately affect communities of color all take a macroeconomic toll that has not
yet been quantified.46 Based upon the best economic studies and data avail-
42. Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Eric C. Newburger, U.S. Census Bureau, The Big Payoff: Educa-
tional Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, Current Population Re-
ports P23-210, at 12-13 tbl.3, 7 fig.7 (Washington, 2002, available at <http://www.census.gov/
prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf> [hereinafter The Big Payoff].
43. Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income in the United States: 2002, Current
Population Reports P60-221, at 11 tbl.4 (Washington, 2003), available at <http://
www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-221.pdf>. In 2002 the per capita income for Latinos
was even less than for African-Americans: about $13,000. Id. With a Latino population of
about 40 million, this translates into an income deficit of over $400 billion. But issues of
language facility and immigrant status cloud how much of this income deficit is attributable
to race.
44. The Big Payoff, supra note 42, at 6-
45. DeNavas-Walt, supra note 43, at 11 tbl.4.
46. To some extent, these costs are captured in disparities in per capita income; but even per
capita income does not reflect lost output due to excess infant mortality and diminished life
expectancy. See id. at9 tbl.3, 11 tbl.4.
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able, it is certain that race is costing our economy hundreds of billions of
dollars annually. Indeed, there is good reason to think that the cost of race
approaches $1 trillion per annum.
Some are tempted to think that any gains to African-Americans necessarily
mean economic costs to other groups. Americans have been programed to
think of race as a zero-sum game, fundamentally misunderstanding the nature
of human capital and the wanton destruction of human capital that is central
to race. Investment in human capital invariably pays for itself and historically
seems not subject to the law of diminishing marginal returns.47 The produc-
tion possibility curve illustrates the opportunity costs associated with less than
full utilization of resources. The full and efficient use of workers moves an
economy toward its production possibility curve. Upgrading an economy's
human capital-its education and skills-necessarily moves its production
possibility curve outward.48
A similar red herring is the so-called efficiency/equity tradeoff. An efficient
economy is one that allows markets to allocate resources. In general, free
market action will not bring about an equitable distribution of resources.
Nevertheless, efficiency has its limits in terms of assuring maximum economic
output. One such limit that is becoming increasingly clear to mainstream
economists is that inequality can diminish growth and productivity. Inequality
itself can be costly in terms of macroeconomic performance, and reducing it
can generate additional economic growth.
49
It is true that some period of adjustment may be necessary for transition
into a less racialized economy, and this period of adjustment may be accompa-
nied by some economic displacement as the utilization and development of
human capital surmounts racial barriers.50 Investments in human capital are a
long-range undertaking: no immediate and rapid adjustment is inherent in
their gradual but steady increase. But the transition can be both accelerated
and steadied through legal structures and frameworks that allow full eco-
nomic exploitation of the nation's diverse human resources. That is in essence
the challenge that race poses to law and economics. The next section explores
these challenges as a means of illustrating the divergent normative implica-
tions of the expanded model of race and law and economics that I propose.
The Challenge Race Poses to Law and Economics
Law and economics is not the only discipline whose pedagogy needs re-
thinking. Economics itself is dealing with the new challenges posed by new
insights about race in America. There is growing consensus that "to teach
economics as if economic discrimination does not exist undermines the
47. See Ramirez, New Deal at 70, supra note 4, at 557-59 (discussuing the effect of the GI Bill
after World War II).
48. Morse, supra note 40, at 3, 6.
49. Id. at 6-7 (citing Paying for Inequality: The Economic Cost of Social Injustice, eds. Andrew
Glyn & David Miliband (London, 1994)).
50. Brimmer, supra note 33, at 12.
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objectives of economics education, namely, to observe, explain, and improve
economic behavior and performance as ways of maximizing social benefits
and minimizing social costs." 5' In the end, law and economics must focus
upon these same goals through a deeper understanding of the impact of law
on economics as well as the impact of economics on law.5 2 Presumably the very
nature of the undertaking is to achieve greater insight into how the law can
maximize social benefits and minimize social costs. If so, it seems clear that law
and economics must begin to address race and its economic implications, and
ask how the law can operate in this context to maximize social benefits and
minimize social costs. For many race-related problems it is virtually impossible
for lawmakers and lawyers to pursue solutions without a firm understanding of
the problem's macroeconomic dimensions.
For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger the Supreme Court held that certain
measures seeking to enhance racial diversity in education furthered a compel-
ling state interest and were constitutionally permissible.53 At the same time the
Court held in Gratz v. Bollinger that certain other measures seeking diversity in
education violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are not narrowly
tailored to meet the compelling state interest in educational diversity.54 Appar-
ently the distinction between those measures that are acceptable and those
that are unacceptable is whether each applicant to an educational institution
receives a "holistic" and "individualized consideration" 55-- an approach that
will necessarily raise the transaction costs for elite state universities that wish to
diversify.
In the course of these holdings the Court articulated some of the stakes at
issue in assessing the importance of diversity. It recognized that the business
community needed more diversity to cope with an increasingly diverse busi-
ness environment, that the military required diversity as a matter of national
security, and that society in general needed visible diversity within its leader-
ship as a matter of political legitimacy. In many ways, this narrow view of the
economic stakes of race is emblematic of a racialized society. As Arrow points
out, a racialized society is necessarily pervaded by racialized thinking. Race
inherently involves the massive destruction of human capital on a scale so vast
as to impose severe macroeconomic costs societywide, but a racialized society
will naturally not see these costs. In other wordsJustice O'Connor's analysis of
the stakes of diversity was severely truncated. She recognized only those costs
that would be likely to be manifest in the briefs of those at the cutting edge of
a society in transition from fully racialized to one that has overcome race. But
she can hardly be held accountable for her blind spot: there is virtually no
51. Elias H. Tuma, Macroeconomics and Discrimination in Teaching, 85 Am. Econ. R. 352, 353
(1995).
52. See Harrison, supra note 7, at 1.
53. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
54. 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003).
55. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276-77 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
56. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-32.
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comprehensive accounting of the wages of race in America. To see fully and
clearly the costs of race, one must fully comprehend the nature of race as a
social construct. One wonders if the balance struck in Grutterand Gratz would
have been fundamentally more indulgent of the efforts of states to contain the
costs of the past years' racial hierarchy if Justice O'Connor had been fully
cognizant of the wages of race in America.
Similarly, O'Connor seems to impose a time limit on the Grutter opinion:
"We expect that 25 years from now,'the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved today. '5 The evidence of the
continuing power of race in our society, despite the imposition of a so-called
colorblind legal regime over the past fifty years, suggests that an attempt to
limit the ability of state educational institutions to achieve greater diversity is
fundamentally misguided from a macroeconomic perspective. The best evi-
dence available strongly suggests that a colorblind legal regime with limited
affirmative action measures is highly unlikely to mitigate the costs our society
bears as a result of American apartheid. Affirmative action dates to 1963. State
law has been stripped of its power to impose a racial hierarchy since 1967.' 8 Yet
the costs of race in America are today as high as ever-or higher. It seems
anomalous that the law could be complicit in American apartheid for centu-
ries, and could affirmatively operate to entrench a racial hierarchy even after a
so-called colorblind legal framework had been imposed for decades, but is
given a rigid deadline for unwinding the macroeconomic catastrophe that we
face today and into the foreseeable future. At some point, one hopes, the law
will comprehend the depths of race in our society and the macroeconomic
costs of allowing it to fester. Such comprehension should support a policy
foundation for greater state affirmative action to mitigate the costs of race,
free of arbitrary and baseless time limits.
A further equal protection idea that must be reexamined in light of the
macroeconomic reality of race is the power to change conduct that perpetu-
ates racial privilege. Recently, legacy preferences in university admissions have
come under attack as a mechanism for preserving a racial privilege that carries
over from yesteryear's apartheid. The beneficiaries of legacy admissions are
"overwhelmingly white." The power of legacy status in our society is well
illustrated by the fact that 40 percent of the legacy pool at Harvard University
gains admission, but only 11 percent of the remainder. 59 White privilege often
benefits from stealth and subtlety; if we are serious about mitigating the
macroeconomic costs of race in our society, equal protection must be retooled
to prohibit more than express racism.6" Instead, unjustified racial privileges
must be prohibited even in the absence of a showing that race is a motivating
factor in behavior with adverse racial impact. I have previously argued that
57. Id. at 343. Justice Ginsburg seems far more cognizant of the reality of race in our society: "we
are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-
sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and schools." Gratz, 539
U.S. at 298-99.
58. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding miscegenation statutes unconstitutional).
59. The Curse ofNepotism, The Economist, Jan. 10, 2004, at 27.
60. See Washington v. Davis, 426 US 229, 246-48 (1976).
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reckless discrimination should be prohibited under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment even in the absence of proof of an intent to discriminate. 6' In addition,
the Equal Protection Clause must reach conduct that perpetuates the old
system of racial privilege and hierarchy, such as legacy admission policies that
disproportionately benefit whites who attended elite universities during the
period of dejure discrimination. The macroeconomic perspective of race in
our society, in any event, shows that the austere equal protection doctrine
(colorblindness) that has essentially prevailed for fifty years is not at all likely
to allow our society to overcome race.
Another area where the macroeconomics of race looms large is a growing
body of law that seeks to facilitate cultural diversity without racial classifica-
tions. Studies have shown that in the world of business a variety of social and
cultural backgrounds can give rise to greater creativity, broader communica-
tion skills, and better decision making within the enterprise, without regard to
any specific racial identity. Alternatively, a police force may wish to hire
persons with specific cultural facilities such as familiarity with gang member-
ship and customs, experience with living in high crime areas, or otherwise
superior understanding of criminal mores.12 Latinos, African-Americans, mi-
norities, or women of all races may broaden the cultural pool that an organiza-
tion can draw upon in pursuit of its institutional mission. Nevertheless, busi-
nesses or other entities that look for valuable skills are simply focusing on the
merit that a job applicant offers an organization-that person's ability to
further the institutional mission-rather than engaging in any racial prefer-
ence. The benefits sought do not arise from gross morphological features
associated with race, but from experience, insight, and cultural skills.63 Conse-
quently, a number of scholars have sought to articulate various means by
which the quest for cultural diversity can operate to ameliorate the costs of
race in our society. 64 Certainly the macroeconomic perspective on the wages
of race supports these proposals and highlights their urgency.
There is an additional lesson to be learned from the economics of race.
Often the most complete understanding of economic dynamics and the
intersection of law and economics may require both microeconomic and
macroeconomic perspectives. Macroeconomics is well suited to providing
insights on the magnitude of problems facing policymakers and lawyers, and
to illuminating the efficacy of market theory in specific contexts.
Microeconomics seems well suited to providing a foundation for understand-
ing market behavior and determining whether specific policies are available
61. Ramirez, supra note 3, at 75-77.
62. Deborah Ramirez & Jana Rumminger, Race, Culture, and the New Diversity in the New
Millennium, 31 Cumb. L. Rev. 481, 518-21 (2001).
63. Ramirez, supra note 18.
64. Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 Stan.J.L. Bus. & Fin. 85 (2000); See, e.g.,
Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty of
Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 389 (2002).
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for facilitating market action. It may be some time before this relationship is
fully understood. Race suggests that law would benefit from greater under-
standing of it.
There is a final lesson from the law and economics of race. Like efficiency
itself, the law (and by extension the law school curriculum) will generally serve
to entrench the power of the social and economic status quo and to ossify
outdated values and structures. While this may be inherent in lawmaking, it is
not inherent to macroeconomics. This article illustrates that a fuller economic
analysis, including macroeconomics, can stem these tendencies. I certainly do
not mean to imply that macroeconomic growth is also ajust result. I only posit
that macroeconomics, focusing as it does on the determinants of growth and
stability, has no inherent bias toward the status quo. Macroeconomic analysis
is therefore remarkably consistent with a more egalitarian distribution of
wealth and opportunity. There is no reason why today's law students should
not be exposed to this branch of economic analysis and its interplay with law.
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